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Self-Perpetuation of Political Networks: Evidence from Mexico


I test the hypothesis of political elite self-perpetuation and present evidence this phenomenon involves political networks broader than families: The prominence of political and government posts a politician is able to attain increases with the prominence of positions previously held by that politician’s relatives, but also those held by their friends and business and political associates. To establish the effect is causal, rather than the result of politically valuable resources and traits shared by network members, I use a peers-of-peers instrumental variables approach wherein I exploit the variation in political attainment of the friends and relatives of a politician’s own friends and relatives.

A Database of Prominent 1935-2009 Mexican Politicians


This paper presents and describes a novel database of Mexican politicians. The database is constructed with information from a directory of Mexican politicians who held public office between 1935 and 2009, and includes data on politicians’ educational backgrounds, elective and appointive positions in government, political party positions, special-interest positions, the private sector and the military. It also contains information on documented personal family and social relationships of included individuals, which allows me to reconstruct political networks. I present summary statistics of the database, analyze the most common career paths followed by top-ranking politicians, and examine the structural features of reconstructed political networks. Then I discuss potential applications and venues of research that can be pursued with the information collected in the database.

An Experimental Study of Auctioneers’ and Bidders’ Preferences over Corruption in Auctions


This paper examines the role of auctioneers’ payoff structure in determining a) their willingness to solicit bribes in exchange for an auctioned item, b) their preference over soliciting a bribe from an auction’s highest- or lowest-bidder, and c) the likelihood an auction is won by its highest-bidder. I conduct an auction experiment with bribery in which auctioneers’ net-of-bribes payoffs are not fixed, but depend on the size of the winning bid. Bribery reduces the probability of victory of highest-bidders and average winning bids. When auctioneers’ payoffs are highly dependent on winning bids they are less likely to solicit a bribe and more likely to choose the highest-bidder when soliciting one. These results indicate that aligning auctioneers’ personal profit-maximization objectives with the desired outcome of the auction mechanism reduces the likelihood and negative effects of bribery in auctions.

Other research work

May 2019 - December 2022: University of Calgary
Research Assistant for Doctors Trevor Tombe and Yu (Sonja) Chen, studying the effect of frictions in financial markets on the growth and productivity of Canadian firms.


January 2018 - April 2018: University of Calgary
Research Assistant for Doctor Arvind Magesan, of the Economics Department, doing econometric research work on the relation between weapons sales and conflict in European countries.


August 2010 – August 2011: Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León
Master’s Degree Thesis: Modeling the Mexican mortgage credit market as a mixed duopoly, in order to evaluate the social quality of Infonavit’s pricing strategies.


August 2007 - December 2008: Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León
Research Assistant in a project to develop an algorithm for the forecasting of potential heart ills, based on statistical measurements of the Fractal Dimension of patients’ electrocardiogram signatures.

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